Home » JLTV A2 Cancellation: Why the Army Walked Away from Its Drone-Defense Truck

TL;DR

  • April 2025: AM General delivered 19 JLTV A2 test vehicles with 250 engineering improvements designed for counter-drone operations
  • May 2025: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth cancelled all future Army purchases, calling ground vehicles “outdated”
  • The split: Marines are continuing the program because mobile C-UAS capability is central to their Force Design 2030 strategy
  • What was fixed: Enhanced corrosion protection, simplified maintenance, revolutionary 24-volt lithium-ion power system enabling modern C-UAS integration
  • The stakes: Army bets future conflicts won’t need this capability at scale; Marines are betting everything on mobile drone defense

JLTV A2 Cancellation

Nineteen cutting-edge tactical trucks rolled out of a brand-new Indiana factory in April 2025, heading straight into eighteen months of military testing. They represented over 250 engineering improvements specifically designed to solve problems the Army had been documenting for years: corrosion eating through chassis, power systems maxed out by modern electronics, maintenance so complex you needed factory representatives for basic service.

AM General had fixed all of it. Built a 96-acre smart factory. Delivered the first test vehicles on schedule.

One month later, the Army cancelled the entire program.

Not suspended. Not delayed. Permanently cancelled—despite the fact that these weren’t experimental prototypes, but production-ready vehicles addressing the signature threat of modern warfare: drones. While the Army walked away, the Marine Corps doubled down, recognizing that if you can’t defend a convoy from drone swarms, you can’t maneuver in contested territory.

What just happened represents either a strategic pivot toward future warfare—or a strategic miscalculation that will haunt ground forces for a generation.


Background & Context: The JLTV Program’s Evolution

From IED Protection to Drone Defense

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program launched in 2006, born from Iraq’s brutal lessons about improvised explosive devices. The original Humvee, introduced in the 1980s, was never designed for the armor protection suddenly required in asymmetric warfare. Initial responses involved bolting on additional armor, but Humvee chassis couldn’t handle the weight—mobility tanked, reliability collapsed, and soldiers died in vehicles too heavy to maneuver out of danger.

Pentagon requirements for the JLTV were clear: mine-resistant protection with Humvee-level mobility, helicopter transportable, blast-survivable, capable of going anywhere the Humvee went while bringing troops home alive.

Oshkosh Defense won the initial contract in 2015 and delivered roughly 20,000 vehicles to the Army and Marine Corps over the next eight years. The platform worked—crews praised its off-road performance, blast protection, and durability under harsh conditions.

The Battlefield Changed Again

JLTV

While the JLTV was being optimized for threats buried in roads, adversaries were developing threats from above. Commercial drone technology exploded globally. China, Russia, and Iran all began fielding or proliferating small unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Non-state actors started using modified consumer quadcopters for reconnaissance and attack missions.

By 2024, the Joint Counter-UAS Office was running swarm demonstrations at Yuma Proving Ground—scenarios involving 40-plus drones converging simultaneously on a single target. The conclusion was stark: no single system works against modern drone threats. Effective defense requires layered capabilities—detection, tracking, identification, and both kinetic and non-kinetic defeat methods, all integrated through command and control networks.

None of that is possible without serious onboard electrical power, which the JLTV A1 simply couldn’t provide.


The Recompetition: AM General’s Second Chance

Why the Army Reopened Bidding

In 2022, the Army decided to recompete the JLTV contract. Congress mandated competition to drive down costs and encourage innovation across the defense industrial base. Oshkosh Defense had been the sole provider since 2015, delivering solid, combat-proven trucks widely deployed across multiple theaters.

AM General—the company that built the original Humvee—won the competition. But rather than simply producing Oshkosh’s design at lower cost, they proposed fixing fundamental problems that had emerged during a decade of JLTV operations.

Three Critical Problems Solved

Problem One: Structural Corrosion
Marines were discovering structural cracks in JLTVs after just a few years of service. Saltwater exposure, road chemicals, and high operational tempo were degrading vehicles faster than predicted, with critical stress fractures appearing in areas that shouldn’t fail. This wasn’t cosmetic rust—it was structural integrity compromise.

Problem Two: Maintenance Nightmare
Young soldiers and Marines couldn’t perform basic upkeep without civilian contractor support. The A1’s component packaging was so dense and tightly engineered for maximum capability that accessing systems meant disassembling substantial portions of the vehicle. What should have been routine maintenance became complex, time-consuming operations requiring specialized knowledge.

Problem Three: Electrical Capacity Ceiling
The JLTV A1 generated between 12.8 and 14.6 kilowatts of electrical power—adequate for 2015 requirements but completely insufficient for 2025, when units needed to simultaneously operate modern radios, electronic warfare gear, active protection systems, and counter-UAS equipment. Some units literally towed generators behind JLTVs because onboard power couldn’t handle mission loads.

The A2 Solution

JLTV A2

AM General addressed all three challenges comprehensively. They incorporated enhanced corrosion protection engineered to exceed 30-year resistance standards. The internal layout was redesigned for tool-free maintenance access, enabling operators to service key components without disassembling half the vehicle.

Most critically, they introduced a revolutionary 24-volt lithium-ion power architecture, replacing the dual lead-acid battery system. This wasn’t just lighter—it provided the electrical foundation for future hybrid systems and the power budget necessary for integrated counter-drone capabilities.

The A2 incorporated over 250 discrete engineering modifications, built specifically to carry the sensors, effectors, and power systems required for effective drone defense at scale.

In February 2023, AM General won an $8.66 billion contract for up to 20,682 vehicles. They constructed a state-of-the-art manufacturing facility from the ground up. In April 2025, they delivered the first A2 test vehicles on schedule.

On May 1, 2025, the Army published a memo: no more JLTV purchases. Ever. The 250 vehicles delivered in January would be the last Army order.


How the JLTV A2 Works: Technical Deep Dive

Powertrain and Efficiency Improvements

The foundation is a 2024 Duramax 6.6-liter turbodiesel engine producing 470 horsepower and 975 pound-feet of torque, paired with an Allison 2500SP six-speed automatic transmission featuring a Generation 6 control module. Through transmission optimization alone, the A2 achieves fifteen percent better fuel efficiency than the A1—a substantial improvement for logistics and operational range.

The Electrical Revolution

The game-changer is the single 24-volt lithium-ion battery system. Instead of two lead-acid battery packs, the A2 uses one advanced lithium system offering higher energy density in a lighter package while enabling future hybridization pathways. The entire electrical architecture was rebuilt around this battery, incorporating a smart power distribution unit that actively manages electrical loads across all vehicle systems.

The upgraded alternator isn’t simply larger—it’s specifically engineered for lithium-ion integration with communications features allowing real-time battery monitoring and intelligent load management. If battery charge drops below operational thresholds, the engine automatically activates to recharge. The system enables silent watch capability for limited periods, running sensors and communications without constant fuel burn.

Why This Matters for Counter-UAS

The A2 now supports multiple simultaneous high-power profiles: vehicle propulsion and systems, communications networks, sensor packages, and effector systems—all dynamically managed through intelligent power distribution. This capability is fundamental to effective counter-drone operations, which require constant radar operation, electronic warfare systems, communications with networked assets, and power reserves for kinetic or directed-energy weapons.


Capabilities & Limitations: What the A2 Can Actually Do

Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS)

The Marine MADIS Proof of Concept

The Marines proved the counter-UAS concept works. Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) has been operationally deployed on JLTV platforms since 2019—two-vehicle teams working in coordinated pairs to detect, track, and kill drones.

The Mk1 variant carries the Kongsberg RS6 remote weapon station with an XM914 30mm chain gun, Stinger missiles, and electronic warfare systems. The Mk2 serves as the sensor and command-and-control node, mounting ground surveillance radar, RF detection systems, and electronic warfare suites.

These trucks hunt drones operationally today, but they’re built on the A1 platform with electrical systems that weren’t originally designed for this mission—constantly juggling power constraints and thermal management challenges.

Layered Defense Integration

Leonardo DRS demonstrated the A2’s potential at AUSA 2024 with their Air Defense Light Variant—a JLTV mounting RPS-42 radar, EOS R400 Slinger 30mm remote weapon station, APKWS laser-guided rockets, and Stinger quad launchers. This represents genuinely layered kinetic defense capability on a mobile tactical platform.

For non-kinetic defeat, BlueHalo’s LOCUST integration demonstrates transformative potential. Their 26-kilowatt Laser Weapon System has accumulated over 10,000 operational combat hours. During September 2024 demonstrations in Socorro, New Mexico, the system destroyed every drone presented over two days of testing—Groups 1 through 3 UAS ranging from small quadcopters to larger fixed-wing platforms.

The 30mm Proximity Ammunition Breakthrough

XM1211 High Explosive Proximity (HEP)

The real force multiplier is 30mm airburst ammunition with proximity fuses. Northrop Grumman’s XM1211 High Explosive Proximity round uses miniaturized RF sensor technology—capability that previously only existed in large-caliber artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles. When the round detects it’s within optimal lethal radius of a target, it detonates automatically. No direct hit required. A two-to-three round burst provides high kill probability against Class 1 and 2 drones.

The cost comparison is stark. A Stinger missile runs $120,000 to $150,000. A Coyote interceptor costs approximately $100,000. One 30mm proximity round costs dramatically less—reports suggest well under $10,000 per shot, though exact pricing remains classified. You can engage dozens of drone threats for the cost of a single traditional air-defense missile.

The Army is developing the XM1223 Multi-Mode Proximity Airburst round—programmable fusing that switches between proximity airburst for drones, proximity delay for troops in defilade, and point-detonation for light armor. One munition type, three threat profiles, all programmed through a contact fuze setter integrated into the weapon station.

This is the layered capability model in practice: detection and tracking through radar and electro-optical/infrared sensors, electronic warfare for soft-kill disruption, kinetic defeat through guns and missiles, and directed energy for cost-effective hard-kill against swarms.

The A2 platform enables all of these systems simultaneously because it solved the power and integration challenges from the electrical architecture upward.


The Cancellation: Strategic Pivot or Strategic Mistake?

What Defense Secretary Hegseth Said

The cancellation came via Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s “Army Transformation Initiative” memo, which characterized ground vehicles like the JLTV as “outdated” and “excess equipment.” The stated rationale centered on pivoting toward Indo-Pacific requirements with maritime focus and reduced dependence on ground vehicle formations.

Army Vice Chief General James Mingus told reporters in May 2025: “We have enough JLTVs. We’ve bought enough already. Inside armor, heavy, and Stryker formations, we have enough.”

The translation: the Army’s heavy and medium formations are already equipped with sufficient tactical vehicles. Light formations will transition to Infantry Squad Vehicles—smaller, faster, and cheaper platforms offering different tactical advantages but less protection and capability.

Why the Marines Are All-In

Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith testified before Congress with a fundamentally different assessment: “The JLTV is our workhorse ground tactical vehicle fleet. We’re fully committed.”

The Marines need MADIS. They need ROGUE-Fires—their remotely operated ground vehicle for anti-ship missiles (NMESIS), which uses the JLTV chassis. They need mobile platforms capable of self-defense while maneuvering in contested littoral environments where air superiority isn’t guaranteed.

ROGUE FIRES - Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)

The Marines are planning to field 190 MADIS systems plus 21 lightweight variants. They’ve procured approximately half of their planned 15,000 total JLTV buy. Mobile counter-UAS capability is central to Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps’ comprehensive transformation strategy for peer conflict.

Commandant Smith acknowledged that per-unit prices “are clearly going to go up” when Army orders disappear. Economies of scale matter significantly in defense procurement. Fewer total vehicles means higher unit costs means intensified budget pressure. But the Marines aren’t stopping—because they’ve concluded this capability is non-negotiable for their operational concept.


Operational Considerations: What Happens Next

For the Manufacturing Base

AM General has backlog through 2027. They’ll fulfill existing contracts—Marine Corps orders and Foreign Military Sales to allies. The Indiana factory continues operating. But the $8.66 billion Army contract that justified building a 96-acre smart manufacturing facility? Dead. The production volume that made the business case viable? Gone.

Six countries are pursuing Foreign Military Sales. Canada approved $220 million for JLTV A2 acquisitions. NATO allies are watching closely because the drone threat is universal—every military operating ground vehicles faces the same challenge of defending convoys and formations from small UAS.

For Army Readiness

The Army is making a calculated strategic bet. General Mingus indicated they have “enough” JLTVs for heavy and Stryker formations. Light infantry formations will receive Infantry Squad Vehicles—smaller, faster, less expensive platforms that won’t survive the same threat environment but offer advantages in mobility and deployability.

The unspoken calculation: Indo-Pacific focus means maritime operations, long-range precision fires, air and naval power projection. Ground vehicle convoys matter less when you’re conducting distributed operations across island chains rather than sustaining large-scale land campaigns like those in Iraq or Afghanistan.

But here’s the problem that doesn’t simply disappear with strategic reorientation: drones.

Ukraine has demonstrated conclusively what happens when you don’t solve counter-UAS at the tactical level. Every convoy becomes a reconnaissance target and potential strike objective. Every static position gets mapped by surveillance drones and engaged by one-way attack systems. The threat environment doesn’t care about your theater of operations or strategic concept.

The Testing Continues Without a Future

The 19 A2 test vehicles delivered in April 2025 will complete their full 18-month evaluation program at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Yuma. The Army will systematically collect data on all 250 engineering improvements—corrosion resistance, maintenance accessibility, power system performance, integration architecture—that they’ll never procure at production scale.

Testing continues because contracts were signed and evaluation protocols are mandated. But there’s no production future for the Army beyond the contracted vehicles already delivered.


Strategic Implications: Deterrence and Future Readiness

The Lessons That Won’t Be Lost

The testing data won’t be wasted entirely. Those corrosion improvements, maintenance enhancements, and power system upgrades will inform future tactical vehicle programs. When the Army eventually needs to replace its existing JLTV fleet—when corrosion catches up, when maintenance backlogs mount, when electrical systems can’t support next-generation sensor and weapons requirements—those engineering lessons remain valuable institutional knowledge.

Counter-UAS technology development continues regardless of the A2’s fate. The 30mm proximity ammunition, directed energy systems, and electronic warfare packages aren’t JLTV-exclusive technologies. They’ll migrate to other platforms: Strykers, Infantry Squad Vehicles, whatever eventually replaces those systems.

High-power microwave systems, AI-enabled targeting algorithms, and hybrid-electric vehicle architectures all continue advancing through separate research programs. The XM1223 Multi-Mode Proximity Airburst round moves toward production qualification. BlueHalo’s LOCUST laser system gets integrated onto multiple platform types. The fundamental technologies don’t die with a single vehicle program.

BlueHalo's LOCUST laser system

The Question Nobody Has Answered

But there’s a question the Army hasn’t publicly addressed: what happens in five years when the existing JLTV fleet requires replacement? When accumulated corrosion reaches critical levels? When maintenance backlogs overwhelm unit-level capabilities? When the A1’s electrical systems definitively can’t support the sensor and effector requirements of 2030?

The Infantry Squad Vehicle is lighter, faster, and cheaper. It’s also significantly less protected, less capable of mounting sophisticated systems, and unable to carry the same counter-UAS integration that MADIS represents. It won’t survive the same threat environment—by design, because it optimizes for different tactical requirements.


Counterpoints & Common Misconceptions

“The Army Already Has Enough JLTVs”

This argument assumes that vehicle quantity equals capability, but it ignores the technological mismatch. The existing JLTV A1 fleet wasn’t designed for the power-intensive counter-drone mission that has emerged as the defining tactical challenge of modern ground warfare. Having 20,000 vehicles with inadequate electrical capacity doesn’t solve the problem—it just means you have 20,000 platforms that can’t effectively integrate the systems you need.

“Drones Are an Air Defense Problem”

Traditional air defense thinking assumes dedicated systems—Patriot batteries, Avenger platforms, man-portable missiles—handle aerial threats. But small UAS operate below traditional air defense radar coverage, in environments where you can’t position dedicated systems with every convoy or patrol. The counter-UAS mission isn’t replacing air defense; it’s filling the gap that traditional systems can’t cover at the tactical edge.

“The Indo-Pacific Doesn’t Need Ground Vehicles”

While the Indo-Pacific theater emphasizes maritime and air power, any conflict scenario involving ground forces—whether defending key island installations, supporting partner nations, or conducting expeditionary operations—will face the exact same drone threats that have proliferated globally. The threat environment is geographic-agnostic. Chinese, Russian, and Iranian small UAS technology has spread worldwide, including to non-state actors.


Ethical & Legal Considerations

Export Control and Technology Proliferation

The JLTV A2’s advanced counter-UAS integration raises standard export control considerations. The 30mm proximity-fused ammunition, directed energy systems, and electronic warfare packages all fall under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and require careful Foreign Military Sales vetting. The six countries pursuing A2 acquisitions must demonstrate both operational need and adequate security measures to prevent technology compromise.

Rules of Engagement in Counter-UAS Operations

Counter-drone operations in contested or permissive environments require clear rules of engagement addressing positive identification, proportionality, and collateral damage considerations. The speed and automation of modern C-UAS systems—particularly those incorporating AI-enabled targeting—demand robust human-in-the-loop protocols to ensure compliance with Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law requirements.


Key Specifications Table

SpecificationJLTV A2JLTV A1 (for comparison)Notes
Engine2024 Duramax 6.6L turbodiesel[Baseline engine spec not provided]470 hp, 975 lb-ft torque
TransmissionAllison 2500SP 6-speed[A1 transmission not specified]Gen 6 control module
Fuel Efficiency15% improvement over A1BaselineThrough transmission optimization
Electrical System24V lithium-ion (single battery)12.8-14.6 kW (dual lead-acid)Enables hybrid future development
Power Output[Specific kW not provided]12.8-14.6 kWUpgraded alternator with smart management
Engineering Improvements250+ modificationsBaseline A1 designCorrosion, maintenance, power focus
Corrosion Resistance30+ year standard[A1 standard not specified]Enhanced protection materials
C-UAS IntegrationDesigned for MADIS/similarRetrofitted capabilityNative electrical architecture support
MaintenanceTool-free access designRequired specialized accessSimplified for operator-level service

[Specific dimensions, weight, payload, and detailed electrical output specifications not provided in source material]


Timeline and Milestones

DateEventSignificance
2006JLTV program launchedResponse to IED threat in Iraq
2015Oshkosh wins initial contractBeginning of JLTV production
2019Marine MADIS operational deploymentProof of concept for mobile C-UAS
2022Army recompetes JLTV contractCongressional mandate for competition
February 2023AM General wins $8.66B contractAward for up to 20,682 vehicles
[Date not specified]AM General builds 96-acre factoryState-of-the-art manufacturing facility
January 2025Last Army order (250 vehicles) deliveredFinal Army A2 purchase
April 2025First 19 A2 test vehicles deliveredBeginning of 18-month evaluation
May 1, 2025Army cancels all future purchasesEnd of Army A2 program
September 2024BlueHalo LOCUST demonstrations26kW laser destroys all targets over 2 days
[Date not specified]Leonardo DRS AUSA 2024 demonstrationAir Defense Light Variant showcase
Through 2027AM General backlog fulfillmentMarine Corps and FMS orders continue

FAQ

Q1: Why did the Army cancel the JLTV A2 if it solved so many problems?

The Army’s official rationale centers on strategic reorientation toward Indo-Pacific operations with reduced emphasis on ground vehicle formations. Defense Secretary Hegseth’s memo characterized ground vehicles as “outdated,” while Army Vice Chief General Mingus stated they have “enough” JLTVs for heavy and Stryker formations. The Army is betting that future conflicts won’t require this level of tactical vehicle capability at scale—prioritizing lighter Infantry Squad Vehicles for expeditionary operations and relying on long-range fires and air power rather than sustained ground maneuver.

Q2: If the Army cancelled the program, why are Marines continuing with it?

The Marine Corps has fundamentally different operational requirements. Mobile counter-UAS capability is central to Force Design 2030—their comprehensive transformation for peer conflict in contested littoral environments. MADIS (Marine Air Defense Integrated System) has been operationally proven since 2019, and the Marines are committed to fielding 190 systems plus 21 lightweight variants. Marine Commandant General Eric Smith testified that “the JLTV is our workhorse ground tactical vehicle fleet”—they need this capability for the missions they expect to execute.

Q3: What’s the actual cost difference between traditional air-defense missiles and the new 30mm proximity rounds?

The cost disparity is dramatic. A Stinger missile costs $120,000 to $150,000. A Coyote interceptor runs approximately $100,000. One 30mm proximity-fused round costs well under $10,000 (exact pricing remains classified). This means you can engage dozens of drone threats for the cost of a single traditional missile—fundamentally changing the cost-exchange ratio that has historically favored attackers using cheap drones against expensive defensive systems.

Q4: What happens to the test vehicles the Army just received?

The 19 A2 test vehicles delivered in April 2025 will complete their full 18-month evaluation program at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Yuma Proving Ground. The Army will systematically collect data on all 250 engineering improvements even though there’s no production future for the Army beyond already-contracted vehicles. The testing data will inform future tactical vehicle programs and modernization efforts, but won’t result in Army A2 procurement.

Q5: Can other countries still buy the JLTV A2?

Yes. Six countries are pursuing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the A2. Canada has already approved $220 million for JLTV A2 acquisitions. NATO allies are watching closely because the drone defense challenge is universal. AM General will continue manufacturing through 2027 to fulfill Marine Corps orders and FMS contracts, though unit costs will increase without Army volume driving economies of scale.

Q6: What’s the real operational difference between the A1 and A2?

The A2 addresses three critical deficiencies: (1) Enhanced corrosion protection exceeding 30-year resistance standards versus A1 structural degradation after just a few years; (2) Tool-free maintenance access versus A1’s complex disassembly requirements; (3) Revolutionary 24-volt lithium-ion power architecture enabling simultaneous operation of modern sensors, weapons, and electronic warfare systems versus A1’s 12.8-14.6 kilowatt ceiling that forced some units to tow generators. The A2 was specifically designed from the electrical architecture up to support integrated counter-drone operations—it’s not just an improved truck, it’s a mobile C-UAS platform.


Conclusion: The Bet That Defines a Generation

The JLTV A2 cancellation represents more than a single program termination—it’s a fundamental wager about the future character of warfare.

The Army is betting that ground vehicle formations matter less in future peer conflicts dominated by long-range precision fires, air superiority, and maritime operations. That lighter, more deployable platforms suit expeditionary requirements better than protected trucks designed for sustained operations in drone-saturated environments. That the Indo-Pacific theater looks fundamentally different from Middle Eastern counter-insurgency or European high-intensity conflict.

The Marines are betting the opposite: that you can’t operate in contested littoral environments without mobile counter-UAS capability. That Force Design 2030 requires platforms capable of defending themselves while maneuvering independently. That the drone threat isn’t theater-specific—it’s the defining tactical challenge of modern ground warfare, period.

One of these services is right. The other will spend the next decade scrambling to catch up.

The irony cuts deep: the Army cancelled a platform specifically engineered for the signature threat demonstrated daily in Ukraine—at the exact moment China, Russia, and Iran are proliferating drone technology globally. They walked away from 250 engineering improvements addressing documented capability gaps, from a program delivered on schedule by a company that built a state-of-the-art factory to meet their requirements.

In five years, when existing JLTVs face corrosion-driven maintenance crises and can’t power the systems required for 2030 operations, the calculus may look different. When ground forces need to maneuver through drone-saturated environments—and they will, regardless of strategic theater—the Marines will have trucks that can do it.

The Army will be explaining why it doesn’t.

What do you think? Was this a strategic pivot toward future warfare or a strategic miscalculation that abandons proven capability at precisely the wrong moment? Share your analysis in the comments—especially if you have operational experience with JLTV platforms or counter-UAS operations. And if this kind of detailed defense analysis is valuable to you, subscribe to our newsletter for weekly deep dives on military technology programs that actually matter.

Combat Tech

Hey there, I’m Stephen — retired USAF veteran with a lifelong passion for military technology and innovation. Welcome to Combat Tech! This is where I share my love for cutting-edge tech, tactical gear, and the incredible advancements shaping the future of defense.

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Combat Tech

Hey there, I’m Stephen — retired USAF veteran with a lifelong passion for military technology and innovation. Welcome to Combat Tech! This is where I share my love for cutting-edge tech, tactical gear, and the incredible advancements shaping the future of defense.

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